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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
LARRY PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 940014-CA
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT, GLENN B. SMITH,
MARIANNE M. SMITH, W. GREG
BUTTARS, and LESLIE E. BUTTARS,

Priority No. 15

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)

(b)

the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except
the
Public
Service
Commission,
State
Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies;....
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The following issue is presented for review:
1.
grant

Was the Utah County Board of Adjustment's decision to

Appellants1

request

for

constructing
1

a private

airport

adequately supported by substantial evidence.
The standard of review is set out in U.C.A. §§17-27-708(2),
(6) (1953, as amended):
(2)

In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the
board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.

(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of
adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. (emphasis added)
The Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the Utah County Board
of Adjustment's decision granting Appellants1 application if it
finds that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's
decision.

"Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence as/ a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1989).
In an appeal from the District Court's judgment after review
of the administrative agency's decision, the Court of Appeals
reviews the decision as if the appeal had come directly from the
agency and there is no presumption of correctness of the District
Court decision, since its review is no more advantageous than that
of the Court of Appeals. Kline Bv and Through Kline v. Utah Dept.
of Health. 776 P.2d 57, at 60 (Ut. Ct. App 1989).

See also Vali

Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care
Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Matter of License of
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45
(1989); Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health,
Div. of Health Care Financing, 751 P.2d 831 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988),
2

cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988); Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah
Securities Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about February 15, 1991, Defendants-Appellants GLENN B.
SMITH, MARIANNE M. SMITH, W. GREG BUTTARS AND LESLIE E. BUTTARS
filed Appeal

#1030 with the Utah County

Board of Adjustments

(hereinafter "Board") requesting an appeal for special exceptions
to build an airstrip for private use in Cedar Valley, Utah County.
On March 5, 1991, the Board met to decide upon the above
request, and after duly considering all relevant safety concerns,
granted Appellants1 application for special exception to build an
airstrip.

(T

42, 47)

The

Board's

trained

zoning

personnel

specifically considered the existence of other airport facilities
in proximity to the requested airstrip. (T 1-3, 6-10) (R 119-124)
The Board concluded that granting the application would not result
in the creation of any hazard to other aircraft or people engaged
in flying activities in the area.
Plaintiff-Appellee, LARRY PATTERSON, owns and operates the
Cedar Valley Airport for commercial purposes, located near the
proposed airport.

Appellee objected to the Board's decision and

filed a Complaint in the Fourth District Court on April 3, 1991.
(R 14) The District Court filed a Memorandum Decision on April 20,
1993, and reversed the Board's decision. (R 139-142)

The District

Court found that the Board acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, and
illegal manner in granting Defendants-Appellants SMITH and BUTTARS'
application for a special exception to the Zoning Ordinance of Utah
3

County."

(R 142)

Appellee did not have a permit to operate his airport and was
in violation of the law at the time Appellants' application was
approved by the Board.

(R 160-162)

Subsequently, Appellants'

proposed private airstrip has been analyzed and approved by the
Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter "FAA") as not posing
any hazard or safety concerns whatsoever. (R 224-228)

The FAA

specifically considered the nearby existence of the Cedar Valley
Airport in its safety determination and concluded that Appellants'
airport will not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of
Appellee's airport.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Board is an administrative body which has specialized
knowledge to make zoning decisions and such decisions should be
given due deference by the reviewing court. The Board thoughtfully
considered all of the relevant facts relating to Appeal #1030,
including all pertinent safety issues presented at its March 5,
1991, meeting.

The Board's decision to approve the appeal is

substantially supported by the transcript for the March 5, 1991,
meeting.
The reviewing court is only empowered to judge whether the
Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the
record, and cannot substitute its own judgment by undertaking an
independent inquiry regarding already established facts. Since the
record substantially supports the Board's decision, this Court
should affirm the Board's decision.
4

Appellee did not have a valid license to operate his airport
and was operating it illegally in violation of the law at the time
of the Board's decision.

As suchf Appellee cannot challenge the

Board's decision and Appellee's claim for airspace is subordinate
to Appellants' senior claim.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BOARD'S DECISION,
AND THE BOARD'S DECISION CANNOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL UNDER THE RELEVANT ZONING ORDINANCE.
A court reviewing the decision of a Board of Adjustment is
required

to

give

considerable

deference

to

the

Board's

interpretation and application of the zoning ordinances.

The

Supreme

the

Court

of Utah

has

recognized

this

in validating

importance of deferring to the administrative bodies charged with
zoning related powers.

In Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp. , the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
We recognize, and reiterate, the proposition that courts
of law cannot substitute their judgment in the area of
zoning regulations for that of a city's governing body.
Also, we are more than cognizant of the proposition that
the governing body of a city is endowed with considerable
latitude in determining the proper uses of property
within its confines. 398 P.2d 27, at 29 (Utah 1965).
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated this deference in Cottonwood
Heights Citizens Association v. Bd. of Comm'n of Salt Lake County,
where the Court said:
In addressing the plaintiff's attack upon the judgment,
there are certain rules to be considered.
Due to the
complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning,
as in other fields where courts review the actions of
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that those
charged with that responsibility (the Commission) have
5

specialized knowledge in that field. Accordingly, they
should be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of
discretion; and their actions endowed with a presumption
of correctness and validity which the courts should not
interfere with unless it is shown that there is no
reasonable basis to justify the action taken. 593 P.2d
133, at 141 (Utah 1979).
From the above, it

is obvious that a court

reviewing

a

decision of a Board of Adjustment must give "wide latitude" to the
discretion

of

"specialized

that

Board.

knowledge,"

While

the

deferring

court

must

to

the

determine

Board's
if

the

"substantial evidence" requirement of U.C.A. §17-27-708(6) is met.
If the "substantial evidence" requirement is met, the court "shall
affirm the decision of the Board."
A.

The Transcript of the Board's Meeting on March 5, 1991,
to
Decide
Upon
Appellants1
Application
Contains
Substantial Evidence to Support the Board's Decision.

In the District Court's Memorandum Decision in this case, the
court's two (2) principal concerns were the potential danger posed
by

the

planes

using

the

Cedar

proximity of Lake Mountain.

Valley

Airport

and

the

close

A careful review of the transcript

from the Board's meeting establishes that there is substantial
evidence that the Board thoughtfully addressed the safety issues of
the airstrip in making its determination that Appellants' proposal
did not pose any safety concerns.
The Zoning Administrator's Office of Utah County prepared and
submitted a report to the Utah County Board of Adjustment for
review and consideration at the meeting held on March 5, 1991, to
act

on

the

application

of

"Smith

& Buttars"

exception" to build an airport. (R 169)
6

for

a

"special

The report contained a

thorough "analysis" consisting of nine (9) numbered paragraphs, a
section outlining all pertinent ordinances and a recommendation.
The report also contained an aerial map and a plot plan. (R 119,
121)
Buck Rose, a trained planner from the Zoning Administrators
staff found that the power lines in the area would not pose a
safety problem for the airstrip. (T 2)

Mr. Rose also stated:

I found that the other airport was far enough away, there
is an airport in Cedar Valley, so I do not see a conflict
between the two. And certainly the degree of flying in
both these airports would be very small, and this one
[the proposed airstrip] would be very small indeed...
(T 3)
Mr. GLENN SMITH answered the Board's inquiries as to the
potential danger posed by other aircraft in the airspace near the
proposed

airstrip

by

telling

the

Board

that

the

altitude

of

aircraft in the area of the proposed airstrip approaching the Salt
Lake City Airport, was probably "6,000 or 7,000 feet above ground
level" (T 9 ) , while "our pattern in operation would be less than
1,000, but the average pattern height at that point would be about
1,000 feet."

(T 10)

Mr. SMITH further noted that he, like the

pilots of planes that fly into the Sait Lake City Airport, was
aware of the jump site to the west of the Cedar Valley Airport and
that his operation would be in the same valley and safer than the
person

"who

through."

is unfamiliar

with

the

area

who

is

just

flying

(T 19)

Mrs. MARIANNE SMITH, addressing the issue of air safety with
regard to other planes, explained that they would communicate by
radio with other planes and probably with the proposed airstrip.
7

(T 20)

Finally,

Mr.

GREG

BUTTARS,

confirming

Mr.

Rose's

observation that there would be little traffic using the proposed
strip, stated that there would only be about two (2) flights per
month or possibly one (1) per week.

(T 27)

When Appellee, Mr. PATTERSON, applied to the Board

for

approval of his Cedar Valley Airport, in June of 1991, his business
license for the airport had expired.

(R 172)

The Board granted

approval for his airport, subject to the following condition:
That the operation of Mr. Patterson's airport not
interfere with the turning patterns or landing patterns
of the previously approved Smith airport.
(emphasis
added) (R 154)
As to any risk Lake Mountain might pose to the operation of
the airstrip, Mr. Rose forewarned the Board that if they believed
that the airstrip was unsafe, they should not vote for it.
I believe that in your approval, you've got to consider
the safety design of the airport. If you feel that it's
unsafe because there's a mountain there, if safety is a
general commission of special exceptions, in fact 7-21-C1. If you feel the design is unsafe regardless of this
other issue, I believe you've got to not vote for it, but
if you feel that it is safe, even though the mountain is
there, then you should. (T 6)
Mr. SMITH detailed

for the Board the FAA approved

and

recommended traffic pattern which he would use at the airstrip. (T
11-13)

Mr. SMITH also demonstrated how the approved pattern would

apply to the proposed airstrip. Id. When Mr. Carlile questioned,
"Is there any situation where it would be necessary to be turning
toward the mountain?" Mr. SMITH responded:

I don't think so. I can't think of any because it's kind
of like having one hundred and eighty degrees to work in
8

and not a narrow path or one quarter of space, which is
not unusual in your bush type or private airstrips out on
farms. (T 13)
To further emphasize the importance of safety, the Board, in
its motion to approve the special exception, prudently included the
condition that "if any building or structure is constructed which
intrudes in the elevations of the approach zone, turning zone or
transition zone," approval would be rescinded.
The above-cited references are part of the evidence contained
in the transcript upon which the Board based its decision.

This

evidence proves that the Board1s decision was not arbitrary and
capricious.

On the contrary, the Board carefully analyzed an

exhaustive list of possible safety concerns and found that the
airport proposal still qualified for approval.

Not only did the

Board take into consideration all existing safety concerns, the
Board's approval was also cognizant of prospective safety concerns
as well, as evidenced by the stipulated condition.
According to American Jurisprudence, "Evidence is substantial
if a conclusion of a trier of the facts can be reasonably based
upon it."

83 Am Jur 2d Zoning §1062.

Furthermore, "substantial

evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Johnson v. Dept. of

Emp. Security. 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
The Utah Code sets forth the standard of review in cases of
this kind.
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of
the decision.
9

(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the
Board of Adjustments decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days
after the Board of Adjustment's decision is final.
(4)(a)

The Board of Adjustment shall transmit to the
reviewing court the record of its proceedings
including its minutes, findings, orders and, if
available, a true and correct transcript of its
proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a
transcript of that tape recording is a true
and correct transcript for purposes of this
subsection.

(5)(a)(i) If there is a record, the district courtfs
review is limited to the record provided by
the board of adjustment.
(ii)
The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside the Board of Adjustment's record
unless that evidence was offered to the Board of
Adjustment and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded by the Board of Adjustment.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses
and take evidence.
(6)
The court shall affirm the decision of the Board of
Adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. (Utah Code Annotated, §17-27-708)
In

light

of

the

above-cited

references,

the

cumulative

evidence that was presented before the Board and upon which the
Board reasonably based its decision to approve Appeal #103 0, was
substantial, and this Court should affirm the Board's decision.
B.

The Board's Decision is Further Validated by the FAA'S
Approval of the Proposed Airstrip, and Cannot be
Characterized as Arbitrary or Capricious.

Subsequent to the Board's decision to approve Appellants'
application, Appellants also received an approval from the FAA. (R
150, 151)

The letter clearly states that "the Federal Aviation
10

Administration (FAA) has no objection to the proposal, it will not
adversely

affect

aircraft.. ."

the

safe

and

efficient

use

of

airspace

by

(R 151)

The letter specifically referred to the existing Cedar Valley
Airport and stated that "In making this determination, the FAA has
considered matters such as the effect the proposal would have on
the existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports,
the effects it would have on the existing airspace structure and
projected programs of the FAA,..."

(R 151)

Therefore, the Board's decision can hardly be characterized as
arbitrary or capricious since it is supported by experts in the
field of aviation.
POINT II
THE REVIEWING COURT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF
THE BOARD WHEN THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
BOARD'S DECISION
In Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, plaintiff
appealed a Board of Adjustment's denial of his variance.
Supreme Court stated
reviewing

the

Board

The Utah

"that the role of the district court in
of Adjustment's

decision

is to

determine

whether the action was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and
capricious."

685 P.2d 1032, at 1034-1035 (Utah 1984).

The Utah

Supreme Court also declared:
The district court undertook to weigh anew the underlying
factual consideration. While there may have been some
evidence in the record to support the trial judge's
findings, it was not his prerogative to weigh the
evidence anew.
His role was limited to determining
whether there was evidence in the record to support the
Board of Adjustment's action. The judge went beyond this
role and decided the case according to his notion of what
11

was in the best interests of the citizens of Salt Lake
City...However, it does not matter whether the judge
agrees or disagrees with the rationale of the Board or
the policy grounds upon which a decision is based. It
does not lie within the prerogative of the trial court to
substitute its judgment for that of the Board where the
record discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's
decision. Id. (emphasis added).
Although

the

Xanthos

action

dealt with

a city

Board

of

Adjustment, the rationale is also applicable to appeals from a
county Board of Adjustment.
The Utah Supreme Court's rationale in Xanthos is supported by
other authorities.

Among the requirements for judicial review of

zoning decisions enumerated by the Kansas Court of Appeals is the
following:
(5) A court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative body, and should not declare the
action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by
the evidence. Martin Marietta Aggregates v. Bd. of Ctv.
Comnf rs, 625 P.2d 516, at 525 (Kan. App. 1980).
The Oregon Court of Appeals declared:
Our review, then, is of the Commission's order, including
the findings and conclusions supporting it.
If those
findings are supported by the evidence from the record on
which the Commission relied, and the conclusions are
supported by those findings, we may not disturb the order
solely because we might reach a different conclusion.
Haviland v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n. 609 P.2d
423, at 425 (Or. App. 1980).
Finally, American Jurisprudence confirms:
While a court reviewing a decision of a Board of Adjustment
may not substitute its judgment for that of the board, it will
examine the records upon which the Board's decision is based
to determine whether the findings of the Board are supported
by substantial evidence. 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning §1062.
The District Court's determination that the Board acted in an
illegal manner in violation of Utah County Ordinance §3-34 is
12

clearly a substitution of its own judgment for that of the Board.
§3-34 reads as follows:
It is the intent of this section to avoid or lessen
hazards from the operation of aircraft, to avoid creation
of new hazards, and to protect the lives of people who
use aircraft facilities. Utah County Ordinance §3-34.
Not only

is there substantial

evidence

in the

record

to

support the Board's decision which alone should have precluded such
a determination by the District Court, there is clear evidence that
the Board considered the safety issues in-depth and came to the
reasoned conclusion that there would be no hazards from granting
the proposed airport.

As in Xanthos:

The record in this case clearly reflects that the Board
of Adjustment's action was not arbitrary or capricious
and that there was a reasonable basis in evidence to
justify it. 685 P.2d at 1035.
As such, the Court of Appeals should confirm the Board's
decision on the basis of substantial evidence in the record.
POINT III
APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE A PERMIT TO OPERATE HIS AIRPORT AND WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AT THE TIME APPELLANTS' APPEAL WAS GRANTED
BY THE BOARD. THEREFORE, APPELLEE'S CLAIM TO AIRSPACE FOR HIS
AIRPORT IS SUBJECT TO APPELLANTS SMITH AND BUTTARS1 CLAIM AS THEY
WERE FIRST IN TIME TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM THE BOARD
On April 23, 1991, Appellee was cited for operating Cedar
Valley Airport without
ordinance.

(R 172)

a license

in violation

of Utah

County

As a result of his non-compliance, Appellee

was required to receive approval for his airport from the Board
before he could obtain a new business license.
Appellants

SMITH and

BUTTARS

obtained

airstrip from the Board on March 5, 1991.
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(R 165)

approval

for their

The Board filed its

approval for Appellee's airport on June 5, 1991, three (3) months
after Appellants.

(R 154)

Between the expiration of his business

license in 1989 and the renewal of his business license in 1991,
Appellee was operating the Cedar Valley Airport in violation of the
law.

The approval

of Appellee's

airport was

subject to the

following condition: "That the operation of Mr. Patterson's airport
not interfere with the turning patterns or landing patterns of the
previously approved Smith airport."
In general, a person

suffering

(R 153)
a legal wrong

due to an

administrative agency action or who is adversely affected by an
agency action, is entitled to judicial review of the agency action.
73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure, §190. A "legal
wrong" means invasion of a legally protected right, due to an
administrative agency action.
706 (9th Cir. 1965).

Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702, at

In this instance, since Appellee's license

had already expired and he was operating his airport in violation
of the law, he did not have any legally protectable rights at the
time of filing his Complaint. A person "adversely affected" is one
who has suffered

some character of prejudice

for which he is

entitled to seek redress in courts. Crank v. McLaughlin, 2 3 S.E.2d
56, at 59 (W. Va. 1942).

Appellee could not have been adversely

affected with respect to Appellants' proposed airstrip infringing
upon any possible rights that Appellee claims he had, since he did
not possess the legal right to operate his airport at the time in
question.

As such, Appellee did not have the proper standing to

file a Complaint against the Board's decision.
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Appellants SMITH and BUTTARS had first priority to airspace
because they received Board approval before Appellee.
Appellants1

Recognizing

first-in-time claim, the Board granted approval for

Appellee's airport, subject to the SMITH airport's flight patterns.
In a similar manner, this Court should acknowledge that Appellants
SMITH and BUTTARS' claim for airspace has priority over Appellee's
claim because Appellants were first-in-time to obtain approval.
Moreover, since Appellee was operating his airport in violation of
the law when Appellants' appeal was granted by the Board, the Board
did not have to consider the effect of Appellants' landing strip on
air traffic in the area created by Appellee's illegally operated
airport.
POINT IV
THE ISSUE OP "SAFETY" OF AN AIRPORT IS
PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW
After receiving approval of their application for a special
exception to construct an airstrip on their property, Appellants
SMITH and BUTTARS received a letter from one Barbara Johnson, an
airport planner

of the

Federal

Aviation

Administration.

pertinent portions of the letter read as follows:
Based on this study, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has no objection to the proposal.
It will not
adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace
by aircraft provided at least one clear 20:1 approach
slope is established and maintained and you contact an
owner of the nearby private use Cedar Valley Airport to
advise the owner(s) of your operation....
This determination does not mean FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the
proposal. It is a determination with respect to the safe
and efficient use of airspace by aircraft and with
respect to the safety of persons and property on the
15

The

ground.
In making this determination, the FAA has considered
matters such as the effect the proposal would have on the
existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring
airports, the effects it would have on the existing
airspace structure and projected programs of the FAA, the
effects it would have on the safety of persons and
property on the ground, and the effects that existing or
proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) and
known natural objects within the affected area would have
on the proposal.
The Federal Aviation Act directs the Secretary

of Trans-

portation to regulate the use of airspace, "in order to insure the
safety

of

aircraft

(navigable) airspace."

and

the

efficient

utilization

of

such

49 U.S.C. §1348(a).

The Federal Aviation Act specifically prohibits states from
enacting or enforcing laws relating to "rates, routes, or services
of any air carrier...(in) interstate air transportation.

49 U.S.C.

§1305(a) (1) .
Appellants contend that the federal law pre-empts state or
local

law on the

issue of regulation

patterns to airports.
under three

of airspace

and

flight

A statute may be construed as pre-emptive

(3) circumstances.

First, Congress, in enacting a

federal statute, may express a clear intent to pre-empt state law.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).

Second, absent

expressed pre-emption, federal law may have an implied pre-emptive
effect if Congress revealed this intent by occupying the field of
regulation. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.

(1984).

There is implied pre-emption when there is a "scheme of federal
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
16

inferences that

Congress left no room to supplement it" or "because the act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the

federal

system will be assumed

enforcement of state laws on the same subject."

to

preclude

Fidelity Federal

Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. De la Ouesta, 458 U.S. 153 (1947) . There
is a third type of pre-emption when state law actually conflicts
with federal law.

Such a conflict occurs where "compliance with

both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers. Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963).
In the case of City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411
U.S. 624 (1973), the United States Supreme Court established that
Congress1

pervasive

regulation

of

aviation

pre-empted

local

attempts to regulate aircraft noise. Lower federal court decisions
are consistent with Burbank.

See E.G. Blue Sky Entertainment,

Inc. . v. Town of Gardener. 711 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1989, Aff'd.,
621 F.2d 227) (Local ordinance regulating parachute jumping and
attendant aircraft noise pre-empted); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater,
711 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983) (Non-proprietor imposed curfew preempted) ; United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.
Ohio, 1978) (Local ordinance prescribing aircraft flight patterns
pre-empted).
In this case, the Federal Aviation Association approved the
flight pattern and approach to the private airstrip proposed to be
constructed by SMITH and BUTTARS.

The FAA considered matters such

as the effect the proposal would have on the existing or planned

17

traffic patterns of neighboring airports, the effects it would have
on the existing airspace structure and projected programs of the
FAA, the effects it would have on the safety of persons and
property on the ground, and the effects that existing or proposed
man-made objects and known natural objects within the effected area
would have on the proposal. The issue of safety of the airport is
thus pre-empted by federal law.

This leaves only the issue of

whether substantial evidence existed in the record supporting the
decision of the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT to permit the construction of
the physical facilities on the proposed airstrip site. This issue
has been treated
CONCLUSION
For the

reasons outlined

above, Appellants

respectfully

request this Court to reverse the decision of the District Court
and to affirm the decision of the Utah County Board of Adjustments
allowing the Appellants1 proposed construction of their airport.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1994.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

GAR^J^ WEIGHT

(J

Attorney/^for Appellants Smith &
Buttars
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 22nd day
of March, 1994, two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants
to the following:
George E. Brown, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
#6 West Main Street, #B
PO Box 346
American Fork, UT 84003
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated, §17-27-708
Memorandum Decision
FAA letter
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KAY 11391
urfT-ALVfcOATVAC

(303)

286-5527
CATE

*xn+G> *TW«X

Mr* Glenn Smith
1001 Monte Vista Ave
Phelanf California 82371

atmAix-x^ux^c

Dear Mr. S m i t h :
rt>/Tw; nr^iaou

An airspace analysis (91-ANM/D-026-NRA) of the proposed privare
^^^A-.
use Cedar Fort Airport near Cedar Fort, Utah, has be'
completed.
Based on this study, the Federal Aviatidn
Administration (FAA) has no objection to the proposal/ it wifcr
not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace Ipy
aircraft provided at least one clear 20:1 approach slope
established and maintained and you contact the owner of the
nearby private use Cedar Valley Airport to advise the owner ( S^C^ZWUOUK'
of your operation. You may want to consider drafting a mutually
satisfactory operating arrangement between the two airport^S
~
You should also be aware that the proposed runway length yf
2600' is less than the minimum recommended 5500' runway lengr&cT*<*****
for a group of aircraft.
Please review the operational
characteristics of your aircraft to ensure it can safely operat5£^ZI^~
off a 2600 ' runway at an airfield elevation of 5300'I have
enclosed a pamphlet on density altitude for your information anS r t
use.
fCUTIMCSTUBOk.

This determination does not mean FAA approval or disapproval <f>f
the physical development involved in the proposal. It is
determination with respect to the safe and efficient use
airspace by aircraft and with respect to the safety of persof^J
and property on the ground.
HOUTlAC SYWftOC

In making this determination, the FAA has considered matters
such as•'••tlie effect the proposal would have on the existing (pS^^ST
planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports, the effects It
would have on the existing airspace structure and projected
programs of the FAA, the effects it would have on the safety <j>f
persons and property on the ground, a:nd the effects t h k ^ ^ ^ " "
existing or proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) aid
known natural objects within the affected area would have on ttS?SZcw»*z
proposal.
I
The FAA cannot prevent: the construction of structures near tn
airport. The airport environs can only be protected througE
such means as local zoning ordinances or acquisition of property
rights.

FAA Form 1360-14.1

($-33)

OFFICIAL RUE COPY

* U ^ G P O ; l S©0-0-768~Ci 2/20101

2
;

^v^.KPt-cta

No evaluation of the environmental aspects of the proposal wf£
*\s.r.*CZrvZOL
made i n r e a c h i n g t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
Therefore, this
determination i s n o t t o be construed as approval of t h e p r o p o r . ^ ^ ^ ^ ; "
from an e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t a n d p o i n t under P u b l i c Law 9 l - l ^ o
(National Environmental P o l i c y Act of 1969).
CAT*
When the airport becomes operational, please complete and retutfS^
the enclosed FAA Form 5010-5f Airport Master Record. If tlie
airport does not become operational within 12 months of the d a f e ^ o ^ r
of this letter, this airspace determination will expire unless
you request a time extension.
CAT*
If in the future you wish to open the airport to public use,
new airspace determination will be required. In addition, f
the airport changes names, changes ownership, or the o w n e x«ruu-.eou7u*t.
changes address, please notify the FAA, NFDC on Form 5010-5 * T «*
the FAA solicits information on the airport without respons
the airport may be considered inactive.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have ai[V
questionst please contact me at the above number.
tf37Ul2£&GKArwAC
Sincerely #

a*Tt

*D</Ttf»0 STkaOL

/$,
turrUi^wouTUM

Barbara Johnson
Airport Planner
Enclosure

wxnry»GyY*8<x

<DCZ

AAS-300 w/7480-1 & sketch
ANM-530
State Aeronautics
Wasatch Front COG (Dennis Coombs)

nswTixi sruao.

DEN-614: BcFofcnson: meh: 5 / 1 / 9 1 : g s m i t h • e r

v«tf.AuretG«A?um[

I MIT

foctuta XTMJA.

i iMrrj^ruAAAruJC

I C*Tt

FAA Form 1360-1<U

(S-S5)

OFFICIAL RLE COPY
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FILED IH
4™ DISTRiCT COURT

STATE Of UTAH
UTAH - ":.--"

APR Z2

IOOSM'^

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

<^T0

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LARRY PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 910400188
vs.
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT, etal.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

This case comes before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Utah County
Board of Adjustment pursuant to § 17-27-708 U.C.A.. Because a transcript of the
proceedings before the Board of Adjustment exists and has been provided to the Court, the
Court's review is limited to the record and a hearing in this matter is unnecessary. § 17-27708(5)(a) U.C.A. After full consideration of the record, including the aforementioned
transcript and plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, the
Court hereby reverses the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The Court finds that the
Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious and illegal manner in granting defendants Smith and
Buttars' application for a special exception to the zoning ordinances of Utah County.
First, the Court notes that while plaintiff appears to have standing to bring this action
in that he is an individual "aggrieved" by the Board's decision, he did not attend the hearing
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of this matter before the Board. As a result, his factual allegations and protests are not part
of the record for purposes of the present plenary review. Further, while plaintiff complains
that he was given no personal notice of the hearing, he does not contend that the board failed
to give public notice as is statutorily required. Therefore, the Court cannot find that
plaintiffs due process right to notification has been violated, and the Court must therefore
limit its review to those facts contained in the record.
Nevertheless, the evidence contained in the record is sufficient to establish that the
Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally in approving the private airport at issue. It
is clear from the transcript of the Board's proceedings that the proposed air strip would be
located on the east side of Cedar Valley, "against" the west slope of Lake Mountain
(Transcript at 1), making aircraft approach from the East impossible. It is also clear from
the record that the proposed airstrip would be within two miles of the existing Cedar Valley
Airport.

(Transcript at 21). The placement of the airstrip at the proposed location would

not allow for an adequate turning radius (two miles) as defined under section 3-34 of the
Utah County Zoning Ordinance. Given the close proximity of the mountain and the
possibility of overlapping and converging flight patterns with aircraft utilizing the nearby
Cedar Valley Airport, the Court must find that the Board violated section 3-34, and that it
acted arbitrarily in finding that the proposed airstrip would promote public health, safety, and
welfare. The Court finds that the location of the proposed airstrip presents an inherently
unsafe situation in contravention of the intent of the Zoning Ordinance:
It is the intent of this section to avoid or lessen hazards resulting from the operation
of aircraft, to avoid creation of new hazards, and to protect the lives of people who
use aircraft facilities.
Utah County Zoning Ordinance § 3-34.
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In making the present ruling, the Court denies defendants Smith and Buttars' Motion
to Dismiss. Because this case impacts on public safety, rather than the mere interests of the
parties, the Court cannot approve or accept the parties' alleged stipulation purporting to
resolve this case by way of compromise. The Court will simply not allow the safety of the
public to be compromised in the way that the parties have suggested.
The Court also denies Utah County's motion to dismiss, finding it to be without
merit. The Court finds that the reasons set forth in plaintiffs Response in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss constitute "good cause" for failure to file a certificate of readiness within
180 days as required under Rule 4-103(2) of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
Furthermore, it is evident from plaintiff's pleadings that the present action is in the form of
an appeal seeking plenary review of a decision of the Utah County Board of Adjustment
pursuant to § 7-24 of the zoning ordinance. Accordingly, as defendant should be well aware,
the undertaking and notice requirements cited by defendant are inapplicable, and the
plaintiff's action is in no way barred by principles of governmental immunity.
Finally, the Court finds that plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement is moot and
inappropriate in that the Court's plenary review pursuant to § 17-27-708 U.C.A. has required
full consideration of the evidence presented to the Board.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
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Dated this 20th day of April, 1993.

cc:

George E. Brown, Jr., Esq.
Mark Brady, Esq.
Gary H. Weight, Esq.
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COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

17-27-801

17-27-708. District court review of board of adjustment decision [Effective July 1, 1992].
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment
may petition the district court for a review of the decision.
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege t h a t the board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the board of
adjustment's decision is final.
(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall transmit to the reviewing court the
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of t h a t tape recording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection.
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the
record provided by the board of adjustment.
(ii) The court m a y not accept or consider any evidence outside the
board of adjustment's record unless t h a t evidence was offered to the
board of adjustment and the court determines t h a t it was improperly
excluded by the board of adjustment.
(b) If there is no record, t h e court may call witnesses and t a k e evidence.
(6) The court shall affirm t h e decision of the board of adjustment if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of t h e board of
adjustment.
(b) (i) Before filing t h e petition, the aggrieved party may petition the
board of adjustment to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the county.
(iii) After t h e petition is filed the petitioner may seek a n injunction staying the board of adjustment's decision.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-708, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 93.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

